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THE EFFECTS OF TARIFF PROVISIONS:
SOME FURTHER OBSERVATIONS
By RuFus G. KING, JR.
Associated with Norman M. Littell, Attorney, Washington, D. C.;
Princeton, A.B., 1938; Yale Law, LL.B., 1943; Member, New York
and District of Columbia Bars; Formerly, Law Clerk to the Honor-
able Thomas W. Swan, U.S. Circuit Court, 2d Circuit, 1943-44,
Attorney, Air Transport Association, 1944-46, International Editor,
Air Cargo Publishing Corp., and President, Tariffs, Inc., 1946-47.
A RECENT article published in this JOURNAL' advances two im-
portant conclusions as to the legal effects of tariffs filed with the
Civil Aeronautics Board pursuant to the requirements of Section 403
of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938Y
The first, that rate and rule provisions properly on file are con-
clusive evidence of the contract of carriage, is buttressed by half a
century of history and judicial affirmation.3 It is a conclusion con-
cerning the validity of the contract of carriage as between the parties,
and means, practically, that when a shipper or passenger accepts the
offer of transportation held out in a filed tariff (and regulated carriers
can make no other offer) , he is bound by every term thereof even though
he proves circumstances which would excuse him from an ordinary
contractual undertaking, e.g., mistake,4 waiver, estoppel, 6 or an express
agreement on different terms.7 This conclusion seems unassailable, with
a narrow reservation as to the outcome in cases of false billing, or out-
right fraud on the part of carriers' agents.8
1 Markham and Blair, "The Effects of Tariff Provisions Filed Under the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938," 15 J. Air L. & C. 251 (1948).
252 Stat. 973, 49 USCA §401 et seq. (Supp. 1948).
3 This is, incidentally, the legal basis upon which nearly all regulated passen-
ger carriers have been induced to drop lengthy contracts of carriage from their
tickets, in favor of a brief tariff reference. It is an equally sound conclusion for
regulated carriers of property, and the standard domestic Airbill now in use
contains such a reference in lieu of contract terms-though surface carriers still
crowd their shipping documents with fine print. The development of a standard,
interchangeable bill of lading for all domestic shipments may become a real possi-
bility when railroads and truckers abandon this useless practice.
4 Pittsburgh, C., C. & S. L. Railway v. Fink, 250 U.S. 577 (1919). Note, 83
A.L.R. 245 (1933).
5 Midstate Co. v. Penna. R. Co., 320 U.S. 356 (1943). See, Phillips v. Grand
Trunk Ry., 236 U.S. 662 (1915) ;.Am. Trust Co. v. Am. Ry. Express Co., 47 F. 2d
16 (CCA 7th, 1931), cert. den. 284 U.S. 629.
6 New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. York & Whitney Co., 102 N.E. 366 (Mass.,
1913), writ of error dis., 239 U.S. 631; Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Johnson, 41 S.W.
2d 14 (Tex. Civ. App., 1931).
7 Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Robinson, 233 U.S. 173 (1914); Chicago &
Alton R. R. Co. v. Kirby, 225 U.S. 155 (1912); Gordon v. Kansas City Southern
Ry. Co., 2 S.W. 2d 675 (Ark., 1928).
8 See dictum in Great Northern R. Co. v. O'Connor, 232 U.S. 508, 515 (1914).
Cf., Pierce Co. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 236 U.S. 278 (1915); Chicago & E. I. R. R.
Co. v. Collins Co., 249 U.S. 186 (1919); Wall-A-Hee v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 41
P. 2d 786 (Wash., 1935).
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The second, that rate and rule provisions properly on file cannot
be avoided or invalidated retroactively on any ground, including un-
lawfulness, provokes the further examination submitted here. This
conclusion goes to the validity of the contract of carriage when chal-
lenged in terms of law or public policy. It means, practically, that the
peculiar inviolability of tariff-governed contracts observed above is to
be extended to preclude not only assaults based on the circumstances
.surrounding a particular transaction but also the substantive assault
of illegality:
"No intimation can be found in the Civil Aeronautics Act that a
passenger or shipper should be entitled to relief from unlawful
tariff provisions involved in past transactions. . .."
The argument runs like this: the Civil Aeronautics Act 10 imposes
on air carriers a statutory duty to publish only "lawful" rates and rules;
since the duty is statutory, the correlative remedies provided in the Act
must be exclusive; the Act confers no power on the Board to give
administrative relief - i.e., award reparations; and, though common
law remedies are expressly reserved, the courts cannot intercede be-
cause such intercession would disrupt the pattern of uniformity which
is a primary objective of legislation in this field. Therefore, unlawful
rates or rules, once properly on file, can only be challenged as to their
prospective operation, and the shipper or passenger who confronts
them in a past transaction is left without his day in court."
THE LAWFULNESS OF RATES AND RULES
Long before the advent of regulatory legislation, in the last quarter
of the Nineteenth Century, courts had imposed rigorous judicial stand-
ards of integrity and performance on the activities of common carriers.
The designation itself - "common," as opposed to "private," carriage -
was a term that carried far more burdens than benefits in its train.
Common carriers were answerable to all the general body of law
affecting contracts, torts, and bailments. And,. besides, they were com-
pelled to serve all comers, up to the limits of capacity and the kind of
service held out.'2 They owed their passengers the highest degree of
care and protective vigilance.13 With respect to property entrusted to
9 Markham and Blair, op. cit., 291.
10 See. 404, 52 Stat. 993, 49 USCA §484 (Supp. 1948).
11 Another line of argument that approaches the same conclusion, albeit more
moderately, is noteworthy in passing: Congress has, under the interstate com-
merce clause, the undisputed power to regulate carrier-passenger and carrier-
shipper transactions; Congress also has the power to delegate such regulatory
powers to administrative agencies, and-subject to rigorous standardization re-
quirements and constitutional limitations-through such agencies to the regu-
lated parties themselves. On this theory, tariffs approved by the Civil Aeronautics
Board would have all the force, but only the force, of enacted statutes. See,
U.S. v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, 155 F. 305 (D.C. Ill., 1907), rev'd on other
grounds, 164 F. 376, cert. den., 212 U.S. 579; Schechter v. United States, 295
U.S. 495 (1935); Notes, 92 A.L.R. 1464 (1933), and 95 A.L.R. 1396 (1934).
12 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Tucker, 230 U.S. 340 (1913); Atwater v. Delaware,
L. & W. R. Co., 2 A. 803 (N.J., 1803).
13 Stokes v. Saltonstall, 38 U.S. 181 (1839).
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them for carriage they were insurors, with strictly limited defenses later
allowed.' 4 In the United States they could not exonerate themselves
from liability for negligence, by contract or otherwise. 5 Their rates
and practices were subject to scrutiny for "reasonableness,' i6 while
judicial relief was available to persons against whom unjust discrimina-
tion had been practiced. 17
The original Interstate Commerce Act' s was not intended as an
alteration of these standards. It purported only to strengthen the appli-
cation of certain principles of the common law.'9 It was enacted not
because new rights and duties were needed vis it vis the railroads, but
because old remedies had proved inadequate - specifically in the area
of extortionate rate-making and discriminatory practices. 20  Tariffs
were required to be published and posted to insure adequate publicity
so that shippers and passengers could protect themselves, but they did
not emerge as standards of lawfulness until 1903,21 and they were not
required to be filed with the Commission until 1906.22 The Commis-
sion's prescriptive powers over rates were partially bestowed on it in
190623 and subsequently enlarged in 191024 and 1920,25 while its author-
ity with respect to bill of lading terms and conditions, affecting car-
rier's liability for property, was open to question as late as 1918,26 and
has only been asserted by indirection since.2 7
There is nothing in this history to suggest an. abandonment of
traditional common law principles in favor of tariff provisions. It is
true that the Commission's importance as a substitute for the courts
14 New Jersey Steam Nay. Co. v. Merchants Bank, 47 U.S. 344 (1848).
15 Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. 357 (1873) ; Bank of Kentucky v. Adams
Express Co., 93 U.S. 174 (1876).
IBLewis-Simas-Jones Co. v. Southern P. Co., 283 U.S. 654 (1930); Smith
v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., 5 N.W. 240 (Wisc., 1880); Root v. Long Island R. Co., 21
N.E. 403 (N.Y., 1889).
17 York Company v. Central Railroad, 70 U.S. 105; A. T. & S. Railroad v.
D. & N. 0. Railroad, 110 U.S. 667 (1884); Banner Grain Co. v. Great Northern
Ry. Co., 137 N.W. 161 (Minn., 1912).
18 Enacted sub nomine ACT TO REGULATE COMMERCE, 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
19 U.S. v. Hanley, 71 F. 672 (D.C. Ill., 1896); Tift v. Southern R. Co., 123 F.
789 (C.C. Ga., 1903).
20 See, 1 SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMIMISSION 46n., 285-6.
21 With the passage of the ELKINS ACT, 32 Stat. 847. See SHARFMAN, op. cit.,
36.
22 By the HEPBURN ACT, 34 Stat. 584. Joint rates had been filed from the out-
set, but only because they were "agreements, or arrangements" between carriers.
See c. 104, §6, 24 Stat. 381, and c. 382, §1, 25 Stat. 856.
28 The HEPBURN ACT, supra, gave only the power to establish maximum
rates. Early attempts at rate-making had been arrested by the courts. I. C. C. v.
Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. R. Co., 167 U.S. 479 (1897).
24 By the MANN-ELKINS ACT, 36 Stat. 539, permitting the Commission to
suspend new rates, and to initiate changes on its own motion.
25 By the TRANSPORTATION ACT OF 1920, 41 Stat. 456, which finally conferred
the power to establish minimum rates.
2 8Alaska S. S. Co. v. U.S., 259 F. 713 (S.D. N.Y., 1918), dismissed as moot,
253 U.S. 113.
27 See, Domestic Bill of Lading and Live Stock Contract, 64 I. C. C. 357, 66
I. C. C. 63 (1921).
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grew rapidly in certain areas, e.g.., rate matters, and that its discretion
was confirmed as exclusive in those areas by the innovation of the
"primary jurisdiction" doctrine in the Abilene case.28 It is also true
that the Interstate Commerce Act was held to have brought all ques-
tions of carriers' liability for property within the ambit of federal law,
by an adroit twist, in 1913, of language that had stood in the Act since
1906 serving another purpose.29 But neither of these developments
swept the whole field of liability. And neither suggests a total substi-
tution of administrative protection, qua "statutory duty," for the en-
tire body of common law that stood, and stands, unchallenged. From
the outset, the Interstate Commerce Act and its later counterparts have
carried savings clauses, preserving common law remedies in express
terms. 30 The intent of Congress to leave the courts open to aggrieved
passengers and shippers could not have been more forcefully indicated.
Yet the full impact of the conclusion reached in the article being
examined here is that all judicial standards have been scrapped, in so far
as they may be contradicted or qualified by tariff provisions, in favor of
the exclusive remedial powers of the regulatory agency - exercised pros-
pectively only in the case of the Civil Aeronautics Board which does
not have reparations powers.3 ' It is one thing to deprive private liti-
gants of their judicial remedies against an established rate structure,
28 Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907) holding
that a shipper complaining of an unreasonable rate would be denied access to the
courts, notwithstanding that they would otherwise have had jurisdiction, where
an adequate administrative review (i.e., by the Commission) lay open to him.
29 The CARMACK AMENDMENT, part of the HEPBURN ACT, 34 Stat. 593 (1906),
in establishing the liability of the initial carrier in through service for loss or
damage during transportation by subsequent carriers, provided that such initial
carrier "shall issue a receipt ... and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof
for any loss, damage, or injury" caused by itself or by such subsequent carriers.
In Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491 (1913), this language was held
to indicate that Congress had intended to preclude the application of state law
in cases of loss, damage, or injury to property moving subject to the Interstate
Commerce Act.
This raises a noteworthy question as to air carriers since the Civil Aero-
nautics Act does not happen to contain such language. It may be argued that the
Act does not reach loss and damage liability for property at all. Compare,
Pennsylvania Railroad v. Hughes, 191 U.S. 477, (1903). But there are authori-
ties from the "pre-Croninger" era to the contrary. See Southern Ry. Co. v. Reid,
222 U.S. 424 (1912). Cf., Siwalk v. Pennsylvania-Central Air Lines, Inc., infra.
Compare People v. Zook and Craig, 17 Law Week 4351 (U.S.S.C. Apr. 25, 1949).
30 The original language: ". . . and nothing in this act contained shall in
any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute,
but the provisions of such act are in addition to such remedies. . . . ACT TO
REGULATE COMMERCE, 24 Stat. 387 (1887). This is carried forward to the
present INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT, 49 USCA §22, and is repeated in the CAR-
MACK AMENDMENT, 49 USCA §20 (11). Cf., COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, 48
Stat. 1099, 47 USCA §414 (Supp. 1948); MOTOR CARRIER ACT OF 1935, 49 Stat.
558, 563, 49 USCA §§316(j), 319 (Supp. 1948); FREIGHT FORWARDER ACT OF
1942, 56 Stat. 295, 49 USCA §1013 (Supp. 1948). Language identical with that
quoted above appears in the CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT OF 1938, 52 Stat. 1027, 49
USCA §676 (Supp. 1948).
31 This matter of reparations has not, however, been definitely settled. The
Interstate Commerce Commission has no such powers under the MOTOR CARRIERS
ACT, cited supra, yet see, Bell Potato Chip Co. v. Aberdeen Truck Line, 43 MCC
337 (1945); Park-Tilford Distillers, Inc., v. United Frt. Tern., Inc., 46 MCC 735
(1947). And see ftn. 55, infra. Cf., United States Rubber Co. v. Associated Trans-
port, Inc., Doc. MC-C-871, Feb. 16, 1948.
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as the courts have done in the Abilene case3 2 and its progeny, with the
argument that to give relief would work an abhorrent prejudice against
others who have paid the rate; it would be quite another to preclude
recovery by a passenger for personal injury, or a shipper for negligent
damage, with the same argument bolstering up a tariff disclaimer
repugnant to the common law.
Concededly, the standards of lawfulness provided for tariff provisions
in the Civil Aeronautics Act may extend exclusively to some areas of
liability and disability - and this though the Act may be interpreted
to withhold the substitute remedy of review by the Board and the award
of reparations. It cannot be conceded that they extend to all.
THE ADEQUACY OF ADMINISTRATIVE SCRUTINY
In order reasonably to imply any intent on the part of Congress
to substitute the prospective power of the Civil Aeronautics Board for
the retroactive power of the courts in dealing with unlawful tariff
terms, it would have to be shown that the Board's power is unequivo-
cally conferred, and accurately and adequately delineated. This is not
the case. There are, on the contrary, fatal gaps in the Board's powers
and duties. In the filing requirement itself, Section 403 (a) ,3 matters
other than rates, fares and charges - i.e., terms affecting other liability
- may be excluded altogether, in the discretion of the Board:
"(a) Every air carrier and every foreign air carrier shall file
with the Board, and print, and keep open to public inspection, tar-
iffs showing all rates, fares, and charges for air transportation * ' *
and showing to the extent required by regulations of the Board,
all classifications, rules, regulations, practices, and services in con-
nection with such air transportation .... ',34 (Emphasis supplied.)
This option would be hard to explain if it had in fact been contem-
plated that tariff provisions would fix all liability. And the Board itself
has taken a position directly contrary to any such interpretation, by
promulgating Par. (b) (6), Economic Regulations 224.1,35 which pro-
vides:
"(6) The filing of a tariff with the Board in no way relieves an
air carrier from liability for any violation of the Act or of regula-
tions issued thereunder."
There was, moreover, an obvious reason for this administrative dis-
claimer. As the Act is drawn, there is one situation in which the Board's
suspension and review powers - i.e., administrative vigilance to insure
lawfulness - will not reach tariff provisions at all. Initial tariffs are
immunized from suspension. 6 If filing alone establishes the unassail-
32 See note 28, supra.
33 52 Stat. 992, 49 USCA §483(a) (Supp. 1948).
34 Ibid.
35 "Filing, Posting and Publishing of Tariffs by Air Carriers and Foreign
Air Carriers"-Revised, 1940.
36 Sec. 1002(g) 52 Stat. 1018, 49 USCA §632(g) (Supp. 1948): "(g) When-
ever any air carrier shall file with the Board a tariff stating a new individual or
joint (between air carriers) rate, fare, or charge for interstate or overseas air
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ability of carriers' tariff terms, then anything filed in an initial tariff
would become unassailable - at least until the slower prescription or
modification procedures37 could be set in motion.
Therefore it would be quite possible as a matter of right, apart from
the possibility of inattention or oversight on the part of the Board's
tariff staff, for an air carrier to file provisions nullifying every one of the
safeguards which passengers and shippers have been accorded in the
past, and to rely on them as absolute exoneration before an injured
litigant. Suffice it to enumerate a few, from the resources of a limited
imagination: a disclaimer of responsibility for willful injury to passen-
gers; a one-day notice requirement for the filing of damage claims; the
privilege of refusing to carry at will. Congress itself would run afoul
of the courts and the constitution if it essayed to legislate such things,3
yet the carrier who slipped them into his tariff could not be brought
to a judicial reckoning.
JUDICIAL REACTIONS
In surface-carrier cases the courts have consistently followed the
Abilene case in holding that no judicial review of lawfulness will be
transportation or any classification, rule, regulation, or practice affecting such
rate, fare, or charge, or the value of the service thereunder, the Board is empow-
ered, upon complaint or upon its own initiative, at once, and, if it so orders, without
answer or other formal pleading by the air carrier, but upon reasonable notice, to
enter upon a hearing concerning the lawfulness of such rate, fare, or charge, or
such classification, rule, regulation, or practice; and pending such hearing and the
decision thereon, the Board, by filing with such tariff, and delivering to the air
carrier affected thereby, a statement in writing of its reasons for such suspension,
may suspend the operation of such tariff and defer the use of such rate, fare, or
charge, or such classification, rule, regulation, or practice, for a period of ninety
days, and, if the proceeding has not been concluded and a final order made within
such period, the Board may, from time to time, extend the period of suspension,
but not for a longer period in the aggregate than one hundred and eighty days be-
yond the time when such tariff would otherwise go into effect; and, after hearing,
whether completed before or after the rate, fare, charge, classification, rule,
regulation, or practice goes into effect, the Board may make such order with
reference thereto as would be proper in a proceeding instituted after such rate,
fare, charge, classification, rule, regulation, or practice had become effective. If
the proceeding has not been concluded and an order made within the period of
suspension, the proposed rate, fare, charge, classification, rule, regulation, or
practice shall go into effect at the end of such period: Provided, That this sub-
section shall not apply to any initial tariff filed by any air carrier." (Emphasis
supplied.)
3 Sec. 1002(d) and (f), 52 Stat. 1018, 49 USCA §642(d) and (f) (Supp.
1948).
38 It is enlightening to compare an enactment in which Congress seems clearly
to have intended and achieved the result imputed to it here, in a narrow field and
subject to precise limits. Section 406(f) of the FREIGHT FORWARDER ACT OF
1942, 56 Stat. 288, 49 USCA §1006(f) (Supp. 1948), provides:
"(f) Whenever in any investigation under this chapter, or in an investiga-
tion instituted upon petition of the freight forwarder concerned, which petition
is hereby authorized to be filed, there shall be brought in issue any rate, charge,
classification, regulation, or practice of any freight forwarder, made or imposed
by authority of any State, the Commission, before proceeding to hear and dispose
of such issue, shall cause the State or States interested to be notified of the pro-
ceeding. The Commission may confer with the authorities of any State having
regulatory jurisdiction over the class of persons subject to this chapter, with
respect to the relationship between rate structures and practices of such persons
subject to the jurisdiction of such State bodies and of the Commission; and to that
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undertaken with respect to rates.89 And the same result has been reached
with respect to other tariff provisions which affect the consideration
paid for a service rendered to whole classes of transportation users, e.g.,
distribution rules,40 routing practices 4 1 and freight classifications. 42 In
these cases, the paramount need for uniformity in the treatment of the
entire class has been continuously remarked and relied upon:
"If a shipper could recover ... for damages resulting from the
exaction of a rate higher than that which would otherwise have pre-
vailed, the amount recovered might, like a rebate, operate to give
him a preference over his trade competitors. It is no answer to say
that each of these might bring a similar action.... Uniform treat-
ment would not result, even if all sued, unless the highly improbable
happened, and the several juries and courts gave to each the same
measure of relief. *"48
This rationale has even been extended, with the same result, to cases
where a large class of persons were distinguishable because some injury
had been worked upon them - e.g., claimants challenging a notice
requirement in connection with a reparations order.44
But such cases are distinguishable from that of a claimant whose
injury puts him in a small class among transportation users, or is not
classifiable at all. In the latter, the argument for uniformity-at-any-
price loses its weight. The passenger who has suffered personal injur-
ies, for instance, or the shipper whose property has been destroyed, is
not in a position where equality with other transportation users simi-
larly situated is of much public concern. If he chooses to assault an
allegedly unlawful provision which stands in his way, he does not there-
by jeopardize the "assurance of uniform treatment" so zealously de-
end the Commission is authorized, under rules to be prescribed by it, to hold joint
hearings with any such State regulatory bodies upon any matters wherein the
Commission is empowered to act and where the rate-making authority of a State
is or may be affected by the action taken by the Commission. The Commission is
also authorized to avail itself of the cooperation, services, records, and facilities
of such State authorities in the enforcement of any provision of this chapter.
Whenever in any such investigation the Commission, after full hearing, finds that
any such rate, charge, classification, regulation, or practice causes any undue or
unreasonable advantage, preference, or prejudice as between persons or localities
in intrastate commerce on the one hand and interstate commerce on the other
hand, or any undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination against interstate
commerce, which is hereby forbidden and declared to be unlawful, it shall pre-
scribe the rate or charge, or the maximum or minimum, or maximum and minimum,
thereafter to be charged, and the classification, regulation, or practice thereafter
to be observed, in such manner as, in its judgment, will remove such advantage,
preference, prejudice, or discrimination. Such rates, charges, classifications, regu-
lations, and practices shall be observed while in effect by the freight forwarders
parties to such proceeding affected thereby, the law of any State or the decision
or order of any State authority to the contrary notwithstanding." (Emphasis
supplied.)
89 Robinson v. B. & 0. R. R., 222 U.S. 506 (1912) ; Mitchell Coal & Coke Co.
v. Penna. R. R., 230 U.S. 247 (1913); Lewis-Simas-Jones Co. v. Southern P. Co.,
283 U.S. 654 (1931).
4 0 Morrisdale Coal Co. v. Penna. R. R. Co., 230 U.S. 304 (1913).
41 Northern Pac. Ry. v. Solum, 247 U.S. 477 (1918).
42 Director General v. Viscose Co., 254 U.S. 498 (1921).
43 Keogh v. Chi. & N. W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922), refusing to take jurisdic-
tion in a rate action brought under the anti-trust laws.
44Phillips v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 236 U.S. 662 (1915).
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fended in the rate cases. His problem - and his rights - would seem
to be that of any ordinary litigant confronted with an unconstitutional
statute or an illegal contract term. If he prevails, he gains a preference
over those who have acquiesced or otherwise lost their remedies. But
this alone has never shocked the judicial conscience.
Such cases, clearly put, have been rare in the courts. The issue of
lawfulness has often been obscured by other considerations; the cases
are easily confused with the vast array of judicial precedent supporting
the conclusive effect of tariffs as evidence of the contract of carriage. 45
But there have been a few, and when squarely invoked to do so the
courts have worked their way to the correct result, applying their own
standards of lawfulness to the challenged provision, in almost every case.
Although some of the early opinions employed slightly intemper-
ate language in affirming the force of tariffs without qualification, a
clear note of caution was sounded in Kansas City S. R. Co. v. Carl, 227
U.S. 639 (1913). There, affirming the validity of a released-value rate,
the Court said:
"The valuation the shipper declares determines the legal rate
where there are two rates based upon valuation. He must take no-
tice of the rate applicable, and actual want of knowledge is no
excuse. ... 46
"Both the adjustment of rates upon the class of articles based
upon differences in valuation, as well as the acceptance of stipu-
lations in the carrier's bill of lading which affect the liability de-
clared by the Carmack Amendment, are administrative duties of
the Commission. To the extent that such limitations are not for-
bidden by law, they become, when filed, a part of the rate.' 41
In Boston & M. R. Co. v. Piper, 246 U.S. 439 (1918), the plaintiff
had shipped cattle on a bill of lading which reduced the carrier's lia-
bility for negligent delay to the mere cost of extra feed consumed -
thus conflicting with the time-honored standard that carriers cannot
exonerate themselves from the consequences of their own negligence.
Delay occurred, and the plaintiff sued for the full damages caused
thereby. In a brief opinion which dismissed the cases on the eviden-
tiary force of filed tariffs as inapplicable in this situation, the Supreme
Court affirmed judgment for the plaintiff for the full amount of his
damage:
"In the bill of lading, now under consideration, there is an ex-
press agreement limiting liability from unusual delay and detention,
caused by the carrier's negligence,.to the amount actually expended
by the shipper in the purchase of food and water for his stock
45 See, Markham and Blair, op. cit., 259-272, for copious citations. Even the
injured passenger is bound by the contract evidenced in applicable tariffs, of
course, as he is not in a limited position among all other contracting parties. It
is only his conflict with allegedly unlawful provisions affecting his recovery-a
conflict which passengers as a class never encounter-that would, in the present
analysis, entitle him to judicial intervention.
46 227 U.S. at 652.
47 Ibid., 654.
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while so detained. This stipulation controvenes the principle that
the carrier may not exonerate itself from losses negligently caused
by it, and is not within the principle of limiting liability to an agreed
valuation which has been made the basis of a reduced freight rate.
Such stipulations as are here involved are not legal limitations
upon the amounts of recovery, but are in effect attempts to limit
the carrier's liability for negligence by a contract which leaves prac-
tically no recovery for damages resulting from such negligence.
While this provision was in the bill of lading, the form of which
was filed with the railroad company's tariffs with the Interstate
Commerce Commission, it gains nothing from that fact. The legal
conditions and limitations in the carrier's bill of lading duly filed
with the Commissioner are binding until changed by that body
(Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Carl, 227 U.S. 639) ; but not so of
conditions and limitations which are, as is this one, illegal, and
consequently void."4 8 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Gooch v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 258 U.S. 22 (1922), Gooch
was injured while traveling on a special "drover's pass," issued pursu-
ant to carrier's filed tariff and containing a 30-day notice requirement.
He failed to give timely notice, and challenged the requirement, when
the carrier pleaded it as a defense to his suit, on the ground that it was
unreasonable. The court sustained the requirement on the merits,
after a careful examination of its reasonableness, with three justices
dissenting because they believed it should have been declared unrea-
sonable.4 9 The case of Pacific S. S. Co. v. Cackette4 9 a presented a harsher
notice requirement, 10 days, and a more aggravated injury, assault on
a female passenger by one of the carrier's employees. She was allowed
to recover though she took no action for 10 months. The court first
attempted to isolate her case and exclude it entirely from the workings
of the regulatory pattern:
"A tariff is ordinarily understood to be a system of rates and
charges. The public, in dealing with a common carrier, are bound
to take notice that it has filed a tariff of rates and charges, and are
chargeable with notice of everything that is properly included in or
related to such system of rates and charges. Rates for passenger
transportation may be, as the court found in the Hooker case [233
U.S. 97 (1914] directly affected by the degree of the carrier's re-
sponsibility for safe carriage and delivery of baggage. No pro-
vision is found in the Interstate Commerce Act which relates to
rights of action against carriers for damage or injuries from neg-
ligence or assault. Notice of claims for such damages has no per-
ceptible relation to rates and charges for transportation.."50
Then, however, it took an unequivocal stand:
"We consider the foregoing considerations conclusive of the ques-
tion here involved, but it may be added that the District Judges for
the Western District of Washington have held that such a limitation
48 246 U.S. at 445.
49 See also, Northern P. R. Co. v. Wall, 241 U.S. 87 (1916), and St. Louis, I.
Mt. & So. Ry. Co. v. Starbird, 243 U.S. 592 (1917), upholding notice requirements,
in connection with claims for damages to property, as reasonable--on the merits.
49a 8 F. 2d 259 (CCA 9th, 1925), cert. den., 269 U.S. 586.
50 8 F. 2d at 261.
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of time for presentation of a claim for injury to a passenger, al-
though printed upon the face of the ticket, is void as unreasonable.
Blackwell v. Alaska S. S. Co. (W.D. Wash., 1923) 1 F. 2d 334."'1
Tariff provisions filed by air carriers have been attacked in the
courts on the ground of unlawfulness twice in the life of the Civil
Aeronautics Act. Neither case is entirely satisfactory, as the issue here
under consideration does not seem to have been artfully pleaded or
exhaustively considered. One, Adler v. Chicago and Southern Air
Lines, Inc., is probably unsound.52 In the Adler case, the plaintiff sued
for damages incurred when the defendant air line cancelled a scheduled
flight. The air line defended on the basis of its tariff rule authorizing
cancellation. Plaintiff challenged the rule as unreasonable. The court,
relying on the Abilene case,53 dismissed the complaint with the asser-
tion that the Civil Aeronautics Board had exclusive jurisdiction to
pass on the lawfulness of the rule in question.54
The second case, Siwalk v. Pennsylvania-Central Airlines Corp.,54 is
more illuminating. There the carrier had filed a tariff rule to the effect
that "liquids" would not be accepted as .baggage. A bottle of mouth-
wash, packed with plaintiff's personal effects, was broken, concededly
by negligent loading and handling, and plaintiff sued for the resulting
damage. It happened that plaintiff was an intrastate passenger, which
introduced the additional question of whether the tariff should control
at all,5 5 but, assuming an affirmative answer to this, the court allowed
recovery, observing that:
"In my opinion the regulations should be construed so as not to
bar a reasonable quantity of toilet liquid for personal use in a trav-
eler's case."
51Id. See also, Union Pac. R. R. Co. v. Burke, 255 U.S. 317 (1921), (filed
released-value provision held void for failure to give option); Erie R. Co. v.
Steinberg, 113 N.E. 814 (Ohio, 1916), (filed limitation of liabilty for luggage lost
held void); Southern Ry. Co. v. Porter, 44 S.E. 2d 688 (Ga., 1947), (filed released-
value provision held void where option unreasonable). Cf., St. Louis S. W. Ry. v.
Spring River Co., 236 U.S. 718 (1915); Warehouse Co. v. U.S., 283 U.S. 501
(1931); Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. U.S., 305 U.S. 507 (1939).
52 41 F. Supp. 366 (E.D. Mo., 1941). Cf., Markham and Blair, op. cit., 281-3.
53 Supra, note 28.
54 Which the Board subsequently did, 4 CAB 113 (1943), without consider-
ing the fact that under the Civil Aeronautics Act it is without power to make
findings with retroactive effect. Its conclusions, sustaining the rule, ended the
matter. See, Jones v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 157 P. 2d 728 (Wash., 1945).
Cf., Schwartzman v. United Air Lines, 6 FRD 517 (D.C. Neb. 1947). Of course if
the Board had found the rule to be unlawful, and if the court had then allowed
recovery (as its opinion implied it would), the correct result, of preserving to
the plaintiff his right to have lawfulness tested, would still have been approached,
albeit in the administrative forum only, and by indirection. Compare the pro-
cedure developed under the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, supra, note 31. This
approach raises obvious difficulties: there is no period of limitation applicable
to such retroactive reviews; the Board's finding would be subject to separate
appeal; it could be a matter of years before plaintiff's primary cause of action
was so much as established.
54a 1 Avi 900 (Cir. Ct., Wayne Co., Mich. 1940).
55 See supra, note 29. It was indicated that under local (Michigan) law the
rule would have been voided as a stipulation purporting to relieve the carrier from
liability for negligence.
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For all its gentleness, this finding amounts to a judicial reformation of
the challenged rule. And note how, on such a set of facts, the uniform-
ity-at-any-price argument breaks down: the rule could have been im-
munized from attack on that basis only by persuading the court that to
allow Mrs. Siwalk to recover would have prejudiced other passengers
who had suffered similarly in the past to an extent repugnant to public
policy.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing analysis and authorities, it does not
seem clearly established that all tariff provisions become, from the
mere act of filing, unassailable. They are the contract of carriage. But
like any other contractual terms, they may be challenged for unlawful-
ness in the courts. And though some may be held sacrosanct out of
respect for the desirable aim of treating all shippers and passengers
alike, there are others which do not seem to affect this aim substan-
tially.5n The line has not been sharply drawn, in the fewadjudicated
cases where it has been questioned. It probably lies between those situ-
ations, on the one hand, where the plaintiff is one of many shippers
or passengers similarly affected by the challenged provision, and those,
on the other, where he complains of an effect peculiar to himself or to
the members of a small class of transportation users.
If the courts do not recognize such a line of demarcation, the Board
will probably be forced to adopt the unsatisfactory, compromise posi-
tion suggested in the Adler case, making retroactive findings on the
basis of which judicial relief can subsequently be obtained, and this
would, of course, expose all provisions to the risk of overthrow. Motor
carriers once stood where air carriers stand today with respect to their
duties as common carriers; the want of equity in their position led the
Interstate Commerce Commission to fashion jurisdiction for itself:
"To hold that a motor carrier which has violated any of these
prescribed duties is immune to civil liability to one injured thereby
while rail and water carriers similarly offending must respond in
damages would be not only at variance with the fundamental rule of
ubi jus ibi remedium but would also disregard the provisions of
[the] sections . . . which preserve all common-law and statutory
remedies."57
56 The courts have sometimes referred to the peculiar qualifications of the
regulatory agency, as a body of experts, to rule on the complicated questions
presented. See, Mor-isdale Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 230 U.S. 304 (1913) ;
Pennsyvania R. Co. v. Puritan Coal Min. Co., 237 U.S. 120 (1915); Pennsylvania
R. Co. v. Sonman S. C. Co., 242 U.S. 120 (1916). This consideration, as a substi-
tute for the uniformity-at-any-price argument, would seem to apply with identical
results. The "reasonableness" of rates, and some practices, is a notoriously com-
plex issue. The lawfulness of other stipulations is not.57 Bell Potato Chip Co. v. Aberdeen Truck Line, supra, note 31.
